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Abstract
Shapley’s discounted stochastic games, Everett’s recursive games and Gillette’s undiscounted
stochastic games are classical models of game theory describing two-player zero-sum games of
potentially infinite duration. We describe algorithms for exactly solving these games. When the
number of positions of the game is constant, our algorithms run in polynomial time.
1 Introduction
Shapley’s model of finite stochastic games [34] is a classical model of game theory describing two-
player zero-sum games of (potentially) infinite duration. Such a game is given by a finite set of
positions 1, . . . , N , with a mk×nk reward matrix (akij) associated to each position k, and an mk×nk
transition matrix (pklij ) associated to each pair of positions k and l. The game is played in rounds,
with some position k being the current position in each round. At each such round, Player I chooses
an action i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,mk} while simultaneously, Player II chooses an action j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nk},
after which the (possibly negative) reward akij is paid by Player II to Player I, and with probability
pklij the current position becomes l for the next round.
During play of a stochastic game, a sequence of rewards is paid by Player II to Player I. There
are three standard ways of associating a payoff to Player I from such a sequence, leading to three
different variants of the stochastic game model:
Shapley games. In Shapley’s original paper, the payoff is simply the sum of rewards. While this
is not well-defined in general, in Shapley’s setting it is required that for all positions k,
∑
l p
kl
ij < 1,
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with the remaining probability mass resulting in termination of play. Thus, no matter which actions
are chosen by the players, play eventually ends with probability 1, making the payoff well-defined
except with probability 0. We shall refer to this original variant of the stochastic games model
as Shapley games. Shapley observed that an alternative formulation of this payoff criterion is to
require
∑
l p
kl
ij = 1, but discounting rewards, i.e., penalizing a reward accumulated at time t by a
factor of γt where γ is a discount factor strictly between 0 and 1. Therefore, Shapley games are
also often referred to as discounted stochastic games. Using the Banach fixed point theorem in
combination with the von Neumann minimax theorem for matrix games, Shapley showed that all
Shapley games have a value, or, more precisely, a value vector, one value for each position. Also, the
values can be guaranteed by both players by a stationary strategy, i.e., a strategy that associates
a fixed probability distribution on actions to each position and therefore does not take history of
play into account.
Gillette games. Gillette [23] requires that for all k, i, j,
∑
l p
kl
ij = 1, i.e., all plays are infinite.
The total payoff to Player I is lim infT→∞(
∑T
t=1 ri)/T where rt is the reward collected at round
t. Such games are called undiscounted or limiting average stochastic games. In this paper, for
coherence of terminology, we shall refer to them as Gillette games. It is much harder to see that
Gillette games have values than that Shapley games do. In fact, it was open for many years if the
concrete game The Big Match with only three positions that was suggested by Gillette has a value.
This problem was resolved by Blackwell and Ferguson [8], and later, Mertens and Neyman [29]
proved in an ingenious way that all Gillette games have value vectors, using the result of Bewley
and Kohlberg [7]. However, the values can in general only be approximated arbitrarily well by
strategies of the players, not guaranteed exactly, and non-stationary strategies (taking history of
play into account) are needed even to achieve such approximations. In fact, The Big Match proves
both of these points.
Everett games. Of generality between Shapley games and Gillette games is the model of
recursive games of Everett [21]. We shall refer to these games as Everett games, also to avoid
confusion with the largely unrelated notion of recursive games of Etessami and Yannakakis [19]. In
Everett’s model, we have akij = 0 for all i, j, k, i..e, rewards are not accumulated during play. For
each particular k, we can have either
∑
l p
kl
ij < 1 or
∑
l p
kl
ij = 1. In the former case, a prespecified
payoff bkij is associated to the termination outcome. Payoff 0 is associated with infinite play. The
special case of Everett games where bkij = 1 for all k, i, j has been studied under the name of
concurrent reachability games in the computer science literature [17, 11, 25, 24]. Everett showed
that Shapley games can be seen as a special case of Everett games. Also, it is easy to see Everett
games as a special case of Gillette games. It was shown in Everett’s original paper that all Everett
games have value vectors. Like Gillette games, the values can in general only be approximated
arbitrarily well, but unlike Gillette games, stationary strategies are sufficient for guaranteeing such
approximations.
For formal definitions and proofs of some of the facts above, see Section 2.
Our Results
In this paper we consider the problem of exactly solving Shapley, Everett and Gillette games, i.e.,
computing the value of a given game. The variants of these two problems for the case of perfect
information (a.k.a. turn-based) games are well-studied by the computer science community, but not
known to be polynomial time solvable: The tasks of solving perfect information Shapley, Everett
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and Gillette games and the task of solving Condon’s simple stochastic games [13] are polynomial
time equivalent [1]. Solving simple stochastic games in polynomial time is by now a famous open
problem. As we consider algorithms for the more general case of imperfect information games, we,
unsurprisingly, do not come up with polynomial time algorithms. However, we describe algorithms
for all three classes of games that run in polynomial time when the number of positions is constant
and our algorithms are the first algorithms with this property. As the values of all three kinds
of games may be irrational but algebraic numbers, our algorithms output real algebraic numbers
in isolating interval representation, i.e., as a square-free polynomial with rational coefficients for
which the value is a root, together with an (isolating) interval with rational endpoints in which this
root is the only root of the polynomial. To be precise, our main theorem is:
Theorem. For any constant N , there is a polynomial time algorithm that takes as input
a Shapley, Everett or Gillette game with N positions and outputs its value vector using isolating
interval encoding. Also, for the case of a Shapley games, an optimal stationary strategy for the game
in isolating interval encoding can be computed in polynomial time. Finally, for Shapley as well as
Everett games, given an additional input parameter ǫ > 0, an ǫ-optimal stationary strategy using
only (dyadic) rational valued probabilities can be computed in time polynomial in the representation
of the game and log(1/ǫ).
We remark that when the number of positions N is constant, what remains to vary is (most
importantly) the number of actions m for each player in each position and (less importantly) the
bitsize τ of transition probabilities and payoffs. We also remark that Etessami and Yannakakis [20]
showed that the bitsize of the isolating interval encoding of the value of a discounted stochastic
game as well as the value of a recursive game may be exponential in the number of positions of the
game and that Hansen, Koucky´ and Miltersen [25] showed that the bitsize of an ǫ-optimal strategy
for a recursive game using binary representation of probabilities may be exponential in the number
of positions of the game. Thus, merely from the size of the output to be produced, there can be no
polynomial time algorithm for the tasks considered in the theorem without some restriction on N .
Nevertheless, the time complexity of our algorithm has a dependence on N which is very bad and
not matching the size of the output. For the case of Shapley games, the exponent in the polynomial
time bound is O(N)N
2
while for the case of Everett games and Gillette games, the exponent is
NO(N
2). Thus, getting a better dependence on N is a very interesting open problem.
Prior to our work, algorithms for solving stochastic games relied either on generic reductions to
decision procedures for the first order theory of the reals [20, 12], or, for the case of Shapley games
and concurrent reachability games on value or strategy iteration [33, 11]. For all these algorithms,
the complexity is at least exponential even when the number of positions is a constant and even
when only a crude approximation is required [24]. Nevertheless, as is the case for the algorithms
based on reductions to decision procedures for the first order theory of the reals, our algorithms
rely on the theory of semi-algebraic geometry [3], but in a more indirect way as we explain below.
Our algorithms are based on a simple recursive bisection pattern which is in fact a very natural
and in retrospect unsurprising approach to solving stochastic games. However, in order to set the
parameters of the algorithm in a way that makes it correct, we need separation bounds for values
of stochastic games of given type and parameters; lower bounds on the absolute value of games
of non-zero value. Such bounds are obtained by bounding the algebraic degree and coefficient
size of the defining univariate polynomial and applying standard arguments, so the task at hand
boils down to determining as good bounds on degree and coefficient size as possible; with better
bounds leading to faster algorithms. To get these bounds, we apply the general machinery of real
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algebraic geometry and semi-algebraic geometry following closely the techniques of the seminal
work of Basu, Pollack and Roy [3]. That is, for each of the three types of games, we describe how
for a given game G to derive a formula in the first order theory of the real numbers uniquely defining
the value of G. This essentially involves formalizing statements proved by Shapley, Everett, and
Mertens and Neyman together with elementary properties of linear programming. Now, we apply
the powerful tools of quantifier elimination [3, Theorem 14.16] and sampling [3, Theorem 13.11]
to show the appropriate bounds on degree and coefficient size. We stress that these procedures
are only carried out in our proofs; they are not carried out by our algorithms. Indeed, if they
were, the time complexity of the algorithms would be exponential, even for a constant number
of positions. While powerful, the semi-algebraic approach has the disadvantage of giving rather
imprecise bounds. Indeed, as far as we know, all published versions of the quantifier elimination
theorem and the sampling theorem have unspecified constants (“big-Os”), leading to unspecified
constants in the code of our algorithms. Only for the case of Shapley games, are we able to do
somewhat better, their mathematics being so simple that we can avoid the use of the general tools
of quantifier elimination and sampling and instead base our bounds on solutions to the following
very natural concrete problem of real algebraic geometry that can be seen as a very special case of
the sampling problem:
Given a system of m polynomials in n variables (where m is in general different from n) of
degree bounded by d, whose coefficients have bitsizes at most τ , and an isolated (in the Euclidean
topology) real root of the system, what is an upper bound on its algebraic degree as a function of d
and n? What is a bound on the bitsizes of the coefficients of the defining polynomial?
Basu, Pollack and Roy [3, Corollary 13.18] stated the upper bound O(d)n on the algebraic
degree as a corollary of the sampling theorem. We give a constructive bound of (2d + 1)n on the
algebraic degree and we derive an explicit bound on the coefficients of the defining polynomial. We
emphasize that our techniques for doing this are standard in the context of real algebraic geometry;
in particular the deformation method and u-resultants are used. However, we find it surprising that
(to the best of our knowledge) no explicit constant for the big-O was previously stated for this very
natural problem. Also, we do not believe that (2d+1)n is the final answer and would like to see an
improvement. We hope that by stating some explicit bound we will stimulate work improving it.
We note that for the case of isolated complex roots, explicit bounds appeared recently, see Emiris,
Mourrain and Tsigaridas [18] and references therein.
The degree bounds for the algebraic problem lead to upper bounds on the algebraic degree
of the values of Shapley games as a function of the combinatorial parameters of the game. We
also provide corresponding lower bounds by proving that polynomials that have among their real
roots the value of certain Shapley games are irreducible. We prove irreducibility based on Hilbert’s
irreducibility theorem and a generalization of the Eisenstein criterion, As these bounds may be of
independent interest, we state them explicitly:
The value of any Shapley game with N positions, m actions for each player in each position, and
rational payoffs and transition probabilities, is an algebraic number of degree at most (2m + 5)N .
Also, for any N,m ≥ 1 there exists a game with these parameters such that its value is an algebraic
number of degree mN−1.
The lower bound strengthens a result of Etessami and Yannakakis [20] who considered the case
of m = 2 and proved a 2Ω(N) lower bound. For the more general case of Everett games and Gillette
games, we are only able to get an upper bound on the degree of the form mO(N
2) and consider
getting improved bounds for this case an interesting problem (we have no lower bounds better than
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for the case of Shapley games). As explained above, replacing the big-Os with explicit constants
requires “big-O-less” versions of the quantifier elimination theorems and sampling theorems of
semi-algebraic geometry. We acknowledge that it is a straightforward but also probably quite
work-intensive task to understand exactly which constants are implied by existing proofs. Clearly,
we would be interested in such results, and are encouraged by recent work of the real algebraic
geometry community [4] essentially providing a big-O-less version of the very related Theorem
13.15 of Basu, Pollack and Roy. We do hypothesize that the constants will be much worse that
the constant of our big-O-less version of Corollary 13.18 of Basu, Pollack and Roy and that merely
stating some constants would stimulate work improving them.
As a final byproduct to our techniques, we give a new upper bound on the complexity of the
strategy iteration algorithm for concurrent reachability games [11] that matches the known lower
bound [24]. We show: The strategy improvement algorithm of Chatterjee, de Alfaro and Henzinger
[11] computes an ǫ-optimal strategy in a concurrent reachability game with N actions, m actions for
each player in each position after at most (1/ǫ)m
O(N)
iterations. Prior to this paper only a doubly
exponential upper bound on the complexity of strategy iteration was known, even for the case of
a constant number of positions [24]. The proof uses a known connection between the patience of
concurrent reachability games and the convergence rate of strategy iteration [24] combined with a
new bound on the patience proved using a somewhat more clever use of semi-algebraic geometry
than in the work leading to the previous bound [25].
Structure of the paper
Section 2 contains background material and notation. Section 3 contains a description of our
algorithms. Section 4 contains the upper bounds on degree of values and lower bounds on coefficient
sizes of defining polynomials and resulting separation bounds of values needed for the algorithm, for
the case of Shapley, Everett and Gillete games. The proof of the exact bounds, big-O-less version,
of the algebraic degree and the separation bounds of the isolated real solutions of a polynomial
system is presented in Section 5. Section 6 presents the lower bound construction on the Shapley
games and the algebraic tools needed for this. Finally, Section 7 contains the consequences of our
results for the strategy improvement algorithm for concurrent reachability are explained.
2 Preliminaries
(Parameterized) Matrix Games
A matrix game is given by a real m × n matrix A of payoffs aij . When Player I plays action
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} and Player II simultaneously plays action j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, Player I receives
a payoff aij from Player II. A strategy of a player is a probability distribution over the player’s
actions, i.e. a stochastic vector. Given strategies x and y for the two players, the expected payoff to
player I is xTAy. We denote by val(A) the maximin value of the game. As is well-known the value
as well as an optimal mixed strategy for Player I can be found by the following linear program, in
variables x1, . . . , xm and v. By fn we denote the vector of dimension n with all entries being 1.
max v
s.t. fnv −ATx ≤ 0
x ≥ 0
fTmx = 1
(1)
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The following easy lemma of Shapley is useful.
Lemma 1 ([34], equation (2)). Let A = (aij) and B = (bij) be m× n matrix games. Then
| val(A)− val(B)| ≤ max
i,j
|aij − bij |
In the following we will find it convenient to use terminology of Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis [6]. We
say that a set of linear constraints are linearly independent if the corresponding coefficient vectors
are linearly independent.
Definition 2. Let P be a polyhedron in Rn defined by linear equality and inequality constraints and
let x ∈ Rn.
1. x is a basic solution if all equality constraints of P are satisfied by x, and there are n linearly
independent constraints of P that are satisfied with equality by x.
2. x is a basic feasible solution (bfs) if x is a basic solution and furthermore satisfies all the
constraints of P .
The polyhedron defined by LP (1) is given by 1 equality constraint and n + m inequality
constraints, in m+1 variables. Since the polyhedron is bounded, the LP obtains its optimum value
at a bfs. To each bfs, (x, v), we may thus associate a set of m+ 1 linearly independent constraints
such that turning all these constraints into linear equations yields a linear system where (x, v) is
the unique solution. Furthermore we may express this solution using Cramer’s rule. We order
the variables as x1, . . . , xm, v, and we also order the constraints so that the equality constraint is
the last one. Let B be a set of m + 1 constraints of the linear program, including the equality
constraint. We shall call such a set B a potential basis set. Define MAB to be the (m+1)× (m+1)
matrix consisting of the coefficients of the constraints in B. The linear system described above can
thus be succinctly stated as follows:
MAB
[
x
v
]
= em+1 .
We summarize the discussion above by the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let v ∈ R and x ∈ Rm be given.
1. The pair (x, v)T is a basic solution of (1) if and only if there is a potential basis set B such
that det(MAB ) 6= 0 and (x, v)T = (MAB )−1em+1.
2. The pair (x, v)T is a bfs of (1) if and only if there is a potential basis set B such that
det(MAB ) 6= 0, (x, v)T = (MAB )−1em+1, x ≥ 0 and fnv −ATx ≤ 0.
By Cramer’s rule we find that xi = det((M
A
B )i)/det(M
A
B ) and v = det((M
A
B )m+1)/det(M
A
B ).
Here (MAB )i is the matrix obtained from M
A
B by replacing column i with em+1.
We shall be interested in parameterized matrix games. Let A be a mapping from RN to m× n
matrix games. Given a potential basis set B we will be interested in describing the sets of parameters
for which B gives rise to a bfs as well as an optimal bfs for LP (1). We let FAB denote the set of
w ∈ RN such that B defines a bfs for the matrix game A(w), and we let OAB denote the set of
w ∈ RN such that B defines an optimal bfs for the matrix game A(w). Let B1 ⊆ {1, . . . , n} be
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the set of indices of the first n constraints that are not in B. Similarly, let B2 ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} be
the indices of the next m constraints that are not in B. We may describe the set FAB as a union
FA+B ∪ FA−B . Here FA+B is defined to be the set of parameters w that satisfy the following m + 1
inequalities:
det(M
A(w)
B ) > 0 ,
det((M
A(w)
B )m+1)−
m∑
i=1
aij det(((M
A(w)
B )i)) ≤ 0 for j ∈ B1,
det((M
A(w)
B )i) ≥ 0 for i ∈ B2.
The set FA−B is defined analogously, by reversing all inequalities above. With these in place we can
describe OAB as the sets of parameters w ∈ FAB for which
det((M
A(w)
B )m+1) = val(A(w)) det(M
A(w)
B ) .
Shapley and Everett games
We will define stochastic games in a general form, following Everett [21], to capture both Shapley
games as well as Everett games (but not Gillette games) as direct specializations. Everett in fact
defined his games abstractly in terms of “game elements”. We shall restrict ourselves to game
elements that are given by matrix games (cf. [32]). Because of this, our precise notation will differ
slightly from the one of Everett.
For that purpose a stochastic game Γ is specified as follows. We let N denote the number
of positions, numbered {1, . . . , N}. In every position k, the two players have mk and nk actions
available, numbered {1, . . . ,mk} and {1, . . . , nk}. If at position k Player I chooses action i and
Player II simultaneously chooses action j, Player I receives reward akij from player II. After this,
with probability skij ≥ 0 the game stops, in which case Player I receives an additional reward bkij from
player II. With probability pklij ≥ 0, play continues at position l. We demand skij +
∑N
l=1 p
kl
ij = 1 for
all positions k and all pairs of actions (i, j). A strategy of a player is an assignment of a probability
distribution on the actions of each position, for each possible history of the play, a history being
the sequence of positions visited so far as well as the sequences of actions played by both players
in those rounds. A strategy is called stationary if it only depends on the current position.
Given a pair of strategies x and y as well as a starting position k, let ri be the random variable
denoting the reward given to Player I during round i (if play has ended we define this as 0). We
define the expected total payoff by τk(x, y) = limn→∞E [
∑n
i=1 ri] , where the expectation is taken
over actions of the players according to their strategies x and y, as well as the probabilistic choices of
the game (In the special cases of Shapley and Everett games the limit always exist). We define the
lower value, vk, and upper value, vk, of the game Γ, starting in position k by vk = supx infy τ
k(x, y),
and vk = infy supx τ
k(x, y). In case that vk = vk we define this as the value vk of the game, starting
at position k. Assuming Γ has a value, starting at position k, we say that a strategy x is optimal
for Player I, starting at position k if infy τ
k(x, y) = vk, and for a given ǫ > 0, we say the strategy x
is ǫ-optimal starting at position k, if infy τ
k(x, y) ≥ vk − ǫ . We define the notions of optimal and
ǫ-optimal analogously for Player II.
A Shapley game [34] is a special case of the above defined stochastic games, where skij > 0
and bkij = 0 for all positions k and all pairs of actions (i, j). Given valuations v1, . . . , vN for
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the positions and a given position k we define Ak(v) to be the mk × nk matrix game where en-
try (i, j) is akij +
∑N
l=1 p
kl
ijvl. The value iteration operator T : R
N → RN is defined by T (v) =(
val(A1(v)), . . . , val(AN (v))
)
. The following theorem of Shapley characterizes the value and opti-
mal strategies of a Shapley game.
Theorem 4 (Shapley). The value iteration operator T is a contraction mapping with respect to
supremum norm. In particular, T has a unique fixed point, and this is the value vector of the
stochastic game Γ. Let x∗ and y∗ be the stationary strategies for Player I and player II where in
position k an optimal strategy in the matrix game Ak(v∗) is played. Then x∗ and y∗ are optimal
strategies for player I and player II, respectively, for play starting in any position.
An Everett game [21] is a special case of the above defined stochastic games, where akij = 0 for
all k, i, j. In contrast to Shapley games, we may have that skij = 0 for some k, i, j. Everett points
out that his games generalize the class of Shapley games. Indeed, we can convert Shapley game Γ
to Everett game Γ′ by letting bkij = a
k
ij/s
k
ij , recalling that s
k
ij > 0.
Given valuations v1, . . . , vN for the positions and a given position k we define A
k(v) to be
the mk × nk matrix game where entry (i, j) is skijbkij +
∑N
l=1 p
kl
ijvl. The value mapping operator
M : RN → RN is then defined by M(v) = (val(A1(v)), . . . , val(AN (v))). Define relations < and 4
on RN as follows:
u < v if and only if
{
ui > vi if vi > 0
ui ≥ vi if vi ≤ 0
, for all i .
u 4 v if and only if
{
ui < vi if vi < 0
ui ≤ vi if vi ≥ 0
, for all i .
Next, we define the regions C1(Γ) and C2(Γ) as follows:
C1(Γ) = {v ∈ RN |M(v) < v},
C2(Γ) = {v ∈ RN |M(v) 4 v}.
A critical vector of the game is a vector v such that v ∈ C1(Γ) ∩ C2(Γ). That is, for every ǫ > 0
there exists vectors v1 ∈ C1(Γ) and v2 ∈ C2(Γ) such that ‖v − v1‖2 ≤ ǫ and ‖v − v2‖2 ≤ ǫ.
The following theorem of Everett characterizes the value of an Everett game and exhibits near-
optimal strategies.
Theorem 5 (Everett). There exists a unique critical vector v for the value mapping M , and this
is the value vector of Γ. Furthermore, v is a fixed point of the value mapping, and if v1 ∈ C1(Γ)
and v2 ∈ C2(Γ) then v1 ≤ v ≤ v2. Let v1 ∈ C1(Γ). Let x be the stationary strategy for player
I, where in position k an optimal strategy in the matrix game Ak(v1) is played. Then for any k,
starting play in position k, the strategy x guarantees expected payoff at least v1,k for player I. The
analogous statement holds for v2 ∈ C2(Γ) and Player II.
Gillette Games
While the payoffs in Gillette’s model of stochastic games cannot be captured as a special case of
the general formalism above, the general setup is the same, i.e., the parameters N,mk, nk, a
k
ij , p
kl
ij
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is as above and the game is played as in the case of Shapley games and Everett games. In Gillette’s
model, we have bkij = 0 and s
k
ij = 0 for all k, i, j. The payoff associated with an infinite play of a
Gillette game is by definition lim infT→∞(
∑T
t=1 ri)/T where rt is the reward collected at round t.
Upper and lower values are defined analogously to the case of Everett and Shapley games, but with
the expectation of the payoff defined in this way replacing τk(x, y). Again, the value of position k is
said to exist if its upper and lower value coincide. An Everett game can be seen as a special case of a
Gillette game by replacing each termination outcome with final reward b with an absorbing position
in which the reward b keeps recurring. The central theorem about Gillette games is the theorem
of Mertens and Neyman [29], showing that all such games have a value. The proof also yields the
following connection to Shapley games that is used by our algorithm: For a given Gillette game Γ,
let Γλ be the Shapley game with all stop probabilities s
k
ij being λ and each transition probability
being the corresponding transition probability of Γ multiplied by 1 − λ. Let vk be the value of
position k in Γ and let vkλ be the value of position k in Γλ. Then, the following holds.
Theorem 6 (Mertens and Neyman).
vk = lim
λ→0+
λvkλ
Real Algebraic Numbers
Let p(x) ∈ Z[x] be a nonzero polynomial with integer coefficients of degree d. Write p(x) =∑d
i=1 aix
i, with ad 6= 0. The content cont(p) of p is defined by cont(p) = gcd(a0, . . . , ad), and we
say that p is primitive if cont(p) = 1. We can view the coefficients of p as a vector a ∈ Rd+1. We
then define the length |p| of p by |p| = ‖a‖2 as well as the height |p|∞ of p by |p|∞ = ‖a‖∞.
An algebraic number α ∈ C is a root of a polynomial in Q[x]. The minimal polynomial of α is
the unique monic polynomial in q ∈ Q[x] of least degree with q(α) = 0. Given an algebraic number
α with minimal polynomial q, there is a minimal integer k ≥ 1 such that p = kq ∈ Z[x]. In other
words p is the unique polynomial in Z[x] of least degree with p(α) = 0, cont(p) = 1 and positive
leading coefficient. We extend the definitions of degree and height to α from p. The degree deg(α)
of α is defined by deg(α) = deg(p) and height |α|∞ of α is defined by |α|∞ = |p|∞.
Theorem 7 (Kannan, Lenstra and Lova´sz). There is an algorithm that computes the minimal
polynomial of a given algebraic number α of degree n0 when given as input d and H such that
deg(α) ≤ d and |α|∞ ≤ H and α such that |α− α| ≤ 2−s/(12d), where
s = ⌈d2/2 + (3d + 4) log2(d+ 1) + 2d log2(H)⌉ .
The algorithm runs in time polynomial in n0, d and logH.
3 Algorithms
In this section we describe our algorithms for solving Shapley, Everett and Gillette games. The
algorithms for Shapley and Everett games proceed along the same lines, using the fact that Shapley
games can be seen as a special case of Everett games explained above. The algorithm for Gillette
games is a reduction to the case of Shapley games using Theorem 6. We proceed by first constructing
the algorithms for Everett and Shapley games and explain the algorithm for Gillette games at the
end of this section.
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Reduced games
Let Γ be an Everett game with N + 1 positions. Denote by V (Γ) the critical vector of Γ. Given a
valuation v for position N +1 we consider the reduced game Γr(v) with N positions, obtained from
Γ in such a way that whenever the game would move to position N + 1, instead the game would
stop and player 1 would receive a payoff v.
Denote by V r(v) the critical vector of the game Γr(v). We have the following basic lemma
shown by Everett.
Lemma 8. For every δ > 0, for all v and for all positions k: (V r(v))k−δ ≤ (V r(v−δ))k ≤ (V r(v))k
≤ (V r(v + δ))k ≤ (V r(v))k + δ. In particular, V r(v) is a continuous monotone function of v in all
components. The first and last inequalities are strict inequalities, unless (V r(v))k = v.
Let V˜ (v) denote the value val(AN+1(V r(v), v)) of the parameterized game for position N + 1,
where the first N positions are given valuations according to V r(v) and position N + 1 is given
valuation v.
Lemma 9. Denote by v∗ component N + 1 of V (Γ). Then the following equivalences hold.
1. Suppose v∗ > 0 and v ≥ 0. Then, V˜ (v) > v ⇔ v < v∗.
2. Suppose v∗ < 0 and v ≤ 0. Then, V˜ (v) < v ⇔ v∗ < v.
Proof. We shall prove only the first equivalence. The proof of the second equivalence is analo-
gous. Assume first that V˜ (v) > v. Since V˜ is continuous we can find z ∈ C1(Γr(v)) such that
val(AN+1(z, v)) > v as well. This implies that (z, v) ∈ C1(Γ) and by definition of C1(Γ) we obtain
that v ≤ v∗. By Theorem 5, V˜ (v∗) = val(AN+1(V r(v∗), v∗)) = val(AN+1(V (Γ))) = v∗. Since
V˜ (v) > v we have v < v∗.
The other part of the equivalence was shown by Everett as a part of his proof of Theorem 5. We
present the argument for completeness. Everett in fact shows that v∗ is the fixpoint of V˜ of minimum
absolute value. That is, V˜ (v∗) = v∗ and whenever V˜ (v) = v we have |v| ≥ |v∗|. Now assume that
v < v∗, and let δ = v∗ − v. From Lemma 8 we have V˜ (v) = V˜ (v∗ − δ) ≥ V˜ (v∗) − δ = v∗ − δ = v.
Since v ≥ 0, from minimality of |v∗| we have the strict inequality V˜ (v) > v.
Recursive bisection algorithm
Based on Lemma 9 we may construct an idealized bisection algorithm Bisect (Algorithm 1) for
approximating the last component of the critical vector, unrealistically assuming we can compute
the critical vector of a reduced game exactly. For convenience and without loss of generality, we
will assume throughout that the payoffs in the game Γ we consider have been normalized to belong
to the interval [−1, 1]. The correctness of the algorithm follows directly from Lemma 9. Given that
we have obtained a sufficiently good approximation for the last component of the critical vector
we may reconstruct the exact value using Theorem 7. What “sufficiently good” means depends on
the algebraic degree and size of coefficients of the defining polynomial of the algebraic number to
be given as output, so we shall need bounds on these quantities for the game at hand.
To get an algorithm implementable as a Turing machine we will have to compute with approx-
imations throughout the algorithm but do so in a way that simulates Algorithm 1 exactly, i.e., so
that the same branches are followed in the if-statements of the algorithm. For this, we need sepa-
ration bounds for values of stochastic games. Fortunately, these follow from the bounds on degree
10
Algorithm 1: Bisect(Γ, k)
Input: Game Γ with N + 1 positions, all payoffs between -1 and 1, accuracy parameter
k ≥ 2.
Output: v such that |v − v∗| ≤ 2−k.
1: if V˜ (0) = 0 then
2: return 0
3: else
4: vl ← 0
5: vr ← sgn(V˜ (0))
6: for i← 1 to k − 1 do
7: v ← (vl + vr)/2
8: if |V˜ (v)| > |v| then
9: vl ← v
10: else
11: vr ← v
12: return (vl + vr)/2
Algorithm 2: ApproxBisect(Γ, k)
Input: Game Γ with N + 1 positions, m actions per player in each position, all payoffs
rationals between -1 and 1 and of bitsize L, accuracy parameter k ≥ 2.
Output: v such that |v − v∗| < 2−k.
1: ǫ← sep(N,m,L, 0)/5
2: v ← val(AN+1([ApproxVal(V r(0), ⌈− log ǫ⌉)]⌈− log ǫ⌉, 0))
3: if |v| ≤ 2ǫ then
4: return 0
5: else
6: vl ← 0
7: vr ← sgn(v)
8: for i← 1 to k − 1 do
9: v ← (vl + vr)/2
10: ǫ← sep(N,m,max(L, i), i)/5
11: v′ ← val(AN+1([ApproxVal(V r(v), ⌈− log ǫ⌉)]⌈− log ǫ⌉, v))
12: if |v′| > |v| then
13: vl ← v
14: else
15: vr ← v
16: return (vl + vr)/2
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Algorithm 3: ApproxVal(Γ, k)
Input: Game Γ with N positions, payoffs between -1 and 1, accuracy parameter k ≥ 2.
Output: Value vector v such that |vi − v∗i | < 2−k for all positions i.
1: if N = 0 then
2: return The empty vector
3: else
4: for i← 1 to N do
5: vi = ApproxBisect(Γ, k), where position i is swapped with position N
6: Return v
and coefficient size needed anyway to apply Theorem 7. Consider a class C of Everett games (In fact
C will be either all Everett games or the subset consisting of Shapley games). Let sep(N,m,L, j)
denote a positive real number so that if v is the value of game Γ ∈ C with N positions, m actions
to each player in every position, and every rational occurring in the description in the game having
bitsize at most L, and v is not an integer multiple of 2−j , then v differs by at least sep(N,m,L, j)
from every integer multiple of 2−j . Also, we let [v]k denote the function that rounds all entries
in the vector v to the nearest integer multiple of 2−k. Our modified algorithm ApproxBisect (for
approximate Bisect) is given as Algorithm 2. The procedure ApproxVal invoked in the code simply
computes approximations to the values of all positions in a game using ApproxBisect.
The correctness of ApproxBisect follows from the correctness of Bisect by observing that the
former emulates the latter, in the sense that the same branches are followed in the if-statements.
For the latter fact, Lemma 1 and Lemma 9 are used.
The complexity of the algorithm is estimated by the inequalities
TApproxVal(N,m,L, k) ≤ NTApproxBisect(N,m,L, k),
and
TApproxBisect(N,m,L, k) ≤ ⌈− log ǫ⌉(TLP(m+ 1, ⌈− log ǫ⌉)
+ TApproxVal(N − 1,m,max{L, k}, ⌈− log ǫ⌉),
where ǫ = sep(N − 1,m,max{L, k}, k)/5, and TLP(m + 1, k) is a bound on the complexity of
computing the value of a m×m matrix game with entries of bitsize k.
Plugging in the separation bound for Shapley games of Proposition 12, we get a concrete
algorithm without unspecified constants. Also, to get an algorithm that outputs the exact algebraic
answer in isolating interval encoding we need to call the algorithm with parameter k appropriately
chosen to match the quantities stated in Theorem 7, taking into account the degree and coefficient
bounds given in Proposition 12. Finally, plugging in a polynomial bound for TLP, the above
recurrences is now seen to yield a polynomial time bound for constant N . However, the exponent
in this polynomial bound is O(N)N
2
, i.e., the complexity is doubly exponential in N . We emphasize
that the fact that the exact value is reconstructed in the end only negligibly changes the complexity
of the algorithm compared to letting the algorithm return a crude approximation. Indeed, an
approximation algorithm following our approach would have to compute with a precision in its
recursive calls similar to the precision necessary for reconstruction. Only for games with only one
position (and hence no recursive calls) would an approximation version of ApproxBisect be faster.
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For the case of Everett games, the degree, coefficient and separation bounds of Proposition 16
similarly yields the existence of a polynomial time algorithm for the case of constant N , with an
exponent of NO(N
2).
Computing strategies
We now consider the task of computing ǫ-optimal strategies to complement our algorithm for
computing values. For Shapley games the situation is simple. By Theorem 4, once we have obtained
the value v∗ of the game, we can obtain exactly optimal stationary strategies x∗ and y∗ by finding
optimal strategies in the matrix games Ak(v∗). Also, if we only have an approximation v˜ to v∗,
such that ‖v∗− v˜‖∞ ≤ ǫ, consider the stationary strategies x˜∗ and y˜∗ given by optimal strategies in
the matrix games Ak(v˜). In every round of play, these strategies may obtain ǫ less than the optimal
strategies. But this deficit is discounted in every round by a factor 1 − λ where λ = min(skij) > 0
is the minimum stop probability. Hence x˜ and y˜ are in fact (ǫ/λ)-optimal strategies.
For Everett games the situation is more complicated, since the actual values v∗ may in fact
give absolutely no information about ǫ-optimal strategies. We shall instead follow the approach
of Everett and show how to find points v1 ∈ C1 and v2 ∈ C2 that are ǫ-close to v∗. Then, using
Theorem 5 we can compute ǫ-optimal strategies by finding optimal strategies in the matrix games
Ak(v1) and A
k(v2), respectively.
Let Γ be an Everett game with N + 1 positions. We first describe how to exactly compute
v1 ∈ C1, given the ability to exactly compute the values; the case of v2 ∈ C2 is analogous. Let v∗
be the critical vector of Γ. In case that v∗i ≤ 0 for all i, then by definition of C1 we have v∗ ∈ C1.
Otherwise at least one entry of v∗ is positive, so assume v∗N+1 > 0. As in Section 3 we consider the
reduced game Γr(v), taking payoff v for position N + 1. By Lemma 9, whenever 0 ≤ v < v∗N+1 we
have V˜ (v) > v. Suppose in fact that we pick v so that v∗N+1−v ≤ ǫ/2. Now let δ = V˜ (v)−v. Recall
V˜ (v) = val(AN+1(V r(v), v)). Now recursively compute z ∈ C1(Γr(v)) such that ‖V r(v) − z‖∞ ≤
min(δ/2, ǫ). Then by Lemma 1 we have that |val(AN+1(V r(v), v))− val(AN+1(z, v))| ≤ δ/2, which
means val(AN+1(z, v)) > v. This means that v1 = (z, v) ∈ C1, and by our choices we have
‖v1− v∗‖∞ ≤ ǫ, as desired. We now have an exact representation of an algebraic vector v1 in C1, ǫ-
approximating the critical vector. The size of the representation in isolating interval representation
is polynomial in the bitsize of Γ (for constant N). From this we may compute the optimal strategies
of Ak(v1) which also form an ǫ-optimal strategy of Γ. The polynomial size bound on v1 implies that
all non-zero entries in this strategy have magnitude at least 2−l where l is polynomially bounded
in the bitsize of Γ. We now show how to get a rational valued 2ǫ-optimal strategy in polynomial
time. For this, we apply a rounding scheme described in Lemmas 14 and 15 of Hansen, Koucky´
and Miltersen [25]. For each position, we now round all probabilities, except the largest, upwards
to L significant digits where L is a somewhat larger polynomial bound than l, while the largest
probability at each position is rounded downwards to L significant digits. Using Lemma 14 (see also
the proof of Lemma 15) of Hansen, Koucky´ and Miltersen [25], we can set L so that the resulting
strategy is 2ǫ-optimal in Γ. This concludes the description of the procedure.
The case of Gillette games
To compute the value of a given Gillette game, we proceed as follows. Based on Theorem 6 we can
similarly to the case of Shapley games and Everett games give degree, coefficient, and separation
bounds for the values of the given game. These are given in Proposition 20. Furthermore, and also
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based on Theorem 6, we can for a given ǫ give an explicit upper bound on the value of λ necessary
for vkλ to approximate v
k within ǫ. This expression for such λ, given in Proposition 22, is of the
form λǫ = ǫ
τmO(N
2)
. Our algorithm proceeds simply by setting ǫ so small that an ǫ-approximation
to the value allows an exact reconstruction of the value using Theorem 7. Such ǫ can be computed
as we have derived degree and coefficient bounds for the value of the Gillette game at hand. We
then run our previously constructed algorithm on the Shapley game Γλ, where λ = λǫ.
4 Degree and separation bounds for Stochastic Games
4.1 Shapley Games
Our bounds on degree, coefficient size, and separation for Shapley games are obtained by a reduction
to the same question about isolated solutions of polynomial systems. The latter is treated in Section
5. In this section we present the reduction as well as stating the consequences obtained from this
and Theorem 23 of Section 5. To analyse our reduction we also need the following simple fact.
Proposition 10 ([3], Proposition 8.12). Let M be an m × m matrix, whose entries are integer
polynomials in variables x1, . . . , xn of degree at most d and coefficients of bitsize at most τ . Then
det(M), as a polynomial in variables x1, . . . , xn is of degree at most dm and has coefficients of
bitsize at most (τ + bit(m))m+ n bit(md+ 1), where bit(z) = ⌈lg z⌉.
Also, denote by B(v, ǫ) the ball around v ∈ RN of radius ǫ > 0, {v′ ∈ RN | ‖v − v′‖2 ≤ ǫ}. We
are now in position to present the reduction.
Theorem 11. Let Γ be a Shapley game, with N positions. Assume that in position k, the two
players have mk and nk actions available. Assume further that all payoffs and probabilities in Γ
are rational numbers with numerators and denominators of bitsize at most τ .
Then there is a system S of polynomials in variables v1, . . . , vN , for which the value vector v∗
of Γ is an isolated root. Furthermore the system S consists of at most ∑Nk=1 (nk+mkmk ) polynomials,
each of degree at most m+2 and having integer coefficients of bitsize at most 2(N+1)(m+1)2τ+1,
where m = maxNk=1 (min(nk,mk)).
Proof. Let v∗ ∈ Rn be the fixpoint of T given by Theorem 4. For all positions k, and for all potential
basis sets Bk corresponding to the parameterized matrix game Ak we consider the closures OA
k
Bk
of
the sets OA
k
Bk
. Since there are finitely many positions and for each position finitely many potential
basis sets, we may find ǫ > 0 such that whenever B(v∗, ǫ) ∩ OAk
Bk
6= ∅ we have v∗ ∈ OAk
Bk
for all
positions k and all potential basis sets Bk. For a given position k, let Bk be the set of such potential
basis sets. Then, for every Bk ∈ Bk define the polynomial
PBk(w) = det((M
Ak(w)
Bk
)mk+1)− wk det(MA
k(w)
Bk
) .
Let P be the system of polynomials consisting of all such polynomials for all positions k. We
claim that v∗ is an isolated root of the system P. First we show that v∗ is in fact a solution.
Consider any position k and any polynomial PBk ∈ P. By construction we have v∗ ∈ OAkBk , and we
may thus find a sequence (wi)∞i=1 in O
Ak
Bk
converging to v∗. Since for every i, wi ∈ OAk
Bk
we have
that det((M
Ak(wi)
B )m+1) − val(Ak(wi)) det(MA(w
i)
B ) = 0, and thus by continuity of the functions
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det, val, and the entries of Ak, we obtain det((M
Ak(v∗)
B )m+1) − val(Ak(v∗)) det(MA
k(v∗)
B ) = 0. But
val(Ak(v∗)) = v∗k and hence PBk(v
∗) = 0.
Next we show that v∗ is unique. Indeed, suppose that v′ ∈ B(v∗, ǫ) is a solution to the system
P. For each position k pick a potential basis set Bk such that Bk describes an optimal bfs for
Ak(v′). Now since v′ ∈ B(v∗, ǫ) as well as v′ ∈ OAk
Bk
we have by definition that Bk ∈ Bk and hence
PBk ∈ P. As a consequence v′ must be a root of PBk . Now, since Bk in particular is a basic
solution we have det(M
Ak(v′)
Bk
) 6= 0. Combining these two facts we obtain
v′k = det((M
Ak(v′)
Bk
)mk+1)/det(M
Ak(v′)
Bk
) ,
and since Bk is an optimal bfs for Ak(v′) we have that val(Ak(v′))k = v
′
k. Since this holds for all
k, we obtain that v′ is a fixpoint of T , and Theorem 4 then gives that v′ = v∗.
To get the system S we take (smallest) integer multiples of the polynomials in S such that all
polynomials have integer coefficients. For a given position k, we have
(nk+mk
mk
)
potential basis sets,
giving the bound on the number of polynomials. Assume now that mk ≤ nk (In case mk > nk we
can consider the dual of the linear program in Lemma 3). Fix a potential basis set Bk.
Using Proposition 10 the degree of PBk(w) is at most 1 + (mk + 1). Further to bound the
bitsize of the coefficients, note that using linearity of the determinant we may multiply each row of
the matrices (M
Ak(w)
Bk
)mk+1 and M
Ak(w)
Bk
by the product of the denominators of all the coefficients
of entries in the same row in the matrix M
Ak(w)
Bk
. This product is an integer of bitsize at most
(N + 1)(mk + 1)τ . Hence, doing this, both matrices will have entries where all the coefficients are
integers of bitsize at most (N + 1)(mk + 1)τ as well. Now by Proposition 10 again the bitsize of
the coefficients of both determinants is at most
((N + 1)(mk + 1)τ + bit(mk))(mk + 1) +N bit(mk + 2) ≤
2(N + 1)(mk + 1)
2τ
From this the claimed bound follow.
We can now state the degree and separation bounds for Shapley games.
Proposition 12. Let Γ be a Shapley game with N positions and m actions for each player in each
position and all rewards and transition probabilities being rational numbers with numerators and
denominators of bitsize at most τ , and let v be the value vector of Γ. Then, each entry of v is an
algebraic number of degree at most (2m+5)N and the defining polynomial has coefficients of bitsize
at most 21m2N2τ(2m+5)N−1. Finally, if an entry of v is not an integer multiple of 2−j, it differs
from any such multiple by at least 2−22m
2N2τ(2m+5)N−1−j(2m+5)N−1.
Proof. From Theorem 11 the value of Γ is among the isolated real solutions of a system of∑N
i=1
(
2m
m
) ≤ 4m polynomials, of degree at most m+2 and bitsize at most 2(N +1)(m+1)2τ +1 ≤
4Nm2τ . Theorem 23 implies that the algebraic degree of the solutions is (2(m+2)+1)N = (2m+5)N
and the defining polynomial has coefficients of magnitude at most
2(8m
2N2τ+8Nm+5N lg(m))(2m+5)N−1 ≤ 221m2N2τ(2m+5)N−1 .
For a position k, let the defining polynomial be A(vk). To compute a lower bound on the
difference between a root of A and a number 2−j, it suffices to apply the map vk 7→ vk + 2−j to A
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and compute a lower bound for the roots of the shifted polynomial. The shifted polynomial also has
degree (2m+5)N , but its maximum coefficient bitsize is now bounded by 21m2N2τ(2m+5)N−1+
j(2m + 5)N + 4 lg(2m + 5)N ≤ 22m2N2τ(2m + 5)N−1 + j(2m + 5)N . By applying Lemma 26 we
get the result.
4.2 Everett Games
Our bounds on degree, coefficient size, and separation for Everett games are obtained by a reduction
to the more general results about the first-order theory of the reals.
Theorem 13. Let Γ be an Everett game, with N positions. Assume that in position k, the two
players have mk and nk actions available. Assume further that all payoffs and probabilities in Γ
are rational numbers with numerators and denominators of bitsize at most τ .
Then there is a quantified formula with N free variables that describes whether a vector v∗ is
the value vector of Γ. The formula has two blocks of quantifiers, where the first block consists of
a single variable and the second block consists of 2N variables. Furthermore the formula uses at
most (2N + 3) + 2(m + 2)
∑N
k=1
(
nk+mk
mk
)
different polynomials, each of degree at most m + 2 and
having coefficients of bitsize at most 2(N +1)(m+2)2 bit(m)τ , where m = maxNk=1 (min(nk,mk)).
Proof. By Theorem 5 we may express the value vector v∗ by the following first-order formula with
free variables v: (∀ǫ)(∃v1, v2) (ǫ ≤ 0) ∨ (‖v − v1‖2 < ǫ ∧ ‖v − v2‖2 < ǫ ∧ v1 ∈ C1(Γ) ∧ v2 ∈ C2(Γ)) .
Here the expressions v1 ∈ C1(Γ) and v2 ∈ C2(Γ) are shorthands for the quantifier free formulas
of polynomial inequalities implied by the definitions of C1(Γ) and C2(Γ). We provide the details
below for the case of C1(Γ). The case of C2(Γ) is analogous. By definition v1 ∈ C1(Γ) means
M(v1) < v1, which in turn is equivalent to ∧Nk=1((val(Ak(v1)) > v1k ∧ v1k > 0) ∨ (val(Ak(v1)) ≥ v1k
∧ (v1k ≤ 0))). Now we can rewrite the predicate val(Ak(v1)) > v1k to the following expression:
∨Bk((v1 ∈ FA
k+
Bk
∧ det((MAk(v1)
Bk
)mk+1) > v1k det(M
Ak(v1)
Bk
)))∨ ((v1 ∈ FAk−Bk ∧ det((M
Ak(v1)
Bk
)mk+1) <
v1k det(M
Ak(v1)
Bk
))), where the disjunction is over all potential basis sets, and each of the expressions
v1 ∈ FAk+Bk and v1 ∈ FA
k−
Bk
are shorthands for the conjunction of the mk+1 polynomial inequalities
describing the corresponding sets.
By a similar analysis as in the proof of Theorem 11 we get the following bounds, assuming
without loss of generality that mk ≤ nk: The predicates v1 ∈ FAk+Bk and v1 ∈ FA
k−
Bk
can be written
as a quantifier free formulas using at most mk + 1 different polynomials, each of degree at most
mk + 2 and having coefficients of bitsize at most 2(N + 1)(mk + 2)
2 bit(mk)τ . Also, the predicate
val(Ak(v1)) > v1k can be written as a quantifier free formula using at most (mk + 2)
(
nk+mk
mk
)
different polynomials, each of degree at most mk + 2 and having coefficients of bitsize at most
2(N + 1)(mk + 2)
2 bit(mk)τ .
Combining these further, for all positions we have the following statement (that shall be used
also in our upper bound for strategy iteration for concurrent reachability games in Section 7).
Lemma 14. The predicate v1 ∈ C1(Γ) can be written as a quantifier free formula using at most∑N
k=1 1+(m+2)
(nk+mk
mk
)
different polynomials, each of degree at most m+2 and having coefficients
of bitsize at most 2(N + 1)(m+ 2)2 bit(m)τ , where m = maxNk=1 (min(nk,mk)).
From this the statement of the theorem easily follows.
We shall also need the following basic statement about univariate representations.
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Lemma 15. Let α be a root of f ∈ Z[x], which is of degree d and maximum coefficient bitsize at
most τ . Moreover, let g(x) = p(x)/q(x) where p, q ∈ Z[x] are of degree at most d, have maximum
coefficient bitsize at most τ , and q(α) 6= 0. Then the minimal polynomial of g(α) is a univariate
polynomial of degree at most 2d and maximum coefficient bitsize at most 2dτ + 7d lg d.
Proof. The minimal polynomial of g(α) is among the square-free factors of the following (univariate)
resultant with respect to y:
r(x) = resy(f(y), q(y)x− p(y)) ∈ Z[x].
The degree of r is bounded by d and its maximum coefficient bitsize is at most 2dτ + 5d lg d [3,
Proposition 8.46]. Any factor of r has maximum coefficient bitsize at most 2dτ +7d lg d, due to the
Landau-Mignotte bound, see, e.g., Mignotte [30].
We can now apply the machinery of semi-algebraic geometry to get the desired bounds on degree
and the separation bounds.
Proposition 16. Let Γ be an Everett game with N positions, m actions for each player in each
position, and rewards and transition probabilities being rational numbers with numerators and de-
nominators of bitsize at most τ , and let v be the value vector of Γ. Then, each entry of v is an
algebraic number of degree at most mO(N
2) and the defining polynomial has coefficients of bitsize at
most τmO(N
2). Finally, if an entry of v is not a multiple of 2−j , it differs from any such multiple
by at least 2−max{τ,j}m
O(N2)
.
Proof. We use Theorem 14.16 (Quantifier Elimination) of Basu, Pollack and Roy [3] on the formula
of Theorem 13 to find a quantifier free formula expressing that v is the value vector of the game.
Next, we use Theorem 13.11 (Sampling) of [3] to this quantifier free formula to find a univariate
representation of the value vector v satisfying the formula from Lemma 13. That is, we obtain
polynomials f, g0, . . . , g2N , with f and g0 coprime, such that v = (g1(t)/g0(t), . . . , g2N (t)/g0(t)),
where t is a root of f . These polynomials are of degree mO(N
2) and their coefficients have bitsize
τmO(N
2). We apply Lemma 15 to the univariate representation to obtain the desired defining
polynomials. Finally, we obtain the separation bound using Lemma 26 in the same way as in the
proof of Proposition 12
4.3 Gillette’s Stochastic Games
Our bounds on degree, coefficient size, and separation for Gillette games are obtained, as in the
case of Everett games but in a more involved way, by a reduction to the more general results about
the first-order theory of the reals.
Theorem 17. Let Γ be a Gillette game, with N positions. Assume that in position k, the two
players have mk and nk actions available. Assume further that all payoffs and probabilities in Γ
are rational numbers with numerators and denominators of bitsize at most τ .
Then there is a quantified formula with N free variables that describes whether a vector v∗ is the
value vector of Γ. The formula has four blocks of quantifiers, where the first three blocks consists
of a single variable and the fourth block consists of N variables. Furthermore the formula uses at
most 4+2(m+2)
∑N
k=1
(nk+mk
mk
)
different polynomials, each of degree at most 2(m+2) and having
coefficients of bitsize at most 2(N + 1)(m+ 2)2 bit(m)τ , where m = maxNk=1 (min(nk,mk)).
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Proof. By Theorem 6 we may express the value vector v∗ by the following first-order formula with
free variables v.
(∀ǫ > 0)(∃λǫ > 0)(∀λ, 0 < λ ≤ λǫ)(∃v′)(v′ = λ val(Γλ) ∧ ‖v′ − v‖2 < ǫ) .
Here Γλ is the (1−λ)-discounted version of Γ, and the expression v′ = λ val(Γλ) is a shorthand for a
quantifier free formula of polynomial equalities and inequalities expressing that v′ is the normalized
vector of values of Γλ, and may be expressed as
N∧
k=1
(∨
Bk
((
v′ ∈ FAkλ+
Bk
∨ v′ ∈ FAkλ−
Bk
)
∧ det((MAkλ(v′)
Bk
)mk+1) = λv
′
k det(M
Ak
λ
(v′)
Bk
)
))
,
using Theorem 4 and where Akλ is the parameterized matrix game corresponding to Γλ obtained as
explained in Section 2. Here, as in the last section, the disjunction is over all potential basis sets,
and each of the expressions v′ ∈ FAkλ+
Bk
and v′ ∈ FAkλ−
Bk
are shorthands for the conjunction of the
mk + 1 polynomial inequalities describing the corresponding sets.
We next analyze the bounds in the following. By a similar analysis as in the proof of Theorem 13
and Theorem 11 we get the following bounds, assuming without loss of generality that mk ≤ nk.
Lemma 18. The predicates v′ ∈ FAkλ+
Bk
and v′ ∈ FAkλ−
Bk
can be written as a quantifier free formulas
using at most mk+1 different polynomials, each of degree at most 2(mk+2) and having coefficients
of bitsize at most 2(N + 1)(mk + 2)
2 bit(mk)τ .
The larger degree compared to the case of Everett games is due to the additional variable λ.
The same is true for the remaining predicate, hence we obtain the following.
Lemma 19. The predicate v′ = λ val(Γλ) can be written as a quantifier free formula using at most∑N
k=1(m+2)
(
nk+mk
mk
)
different polynomials, each of degree at most 2(m+2) and having coefficients
of bitsize at most 2(N + 1)(m+ 2)2 bit(m)τ , where m = maxNk=1 (min(nk,mk)).
From this the statement easily follows.
Proceeding exactly as in the proof of Proposition 16, we may now prove the following proposi-
tion, giving the exact same statement for Gillette games as for Everett games. Note, however, that
since more blocks of quantifiers have to be eliminated, the constants in the big-O’s are likely worse.
Proposition 20. Let Γ be a Gillette game with N positions, m actions for each player in each
position, and payoffs and transition probabilities being rational numbers with numerators and de-
nominators of bitsize at most τ , and let v be the value vector of Γ. Then, each entry of v is an
algebraic number of degree at most mO(N
2), and the defining polynomial has coefficients of bitsize
at most τmO(N
2). Finally, if an entry of v is not a multiple of 2−j , it differs from any such multiple
by at least 2−max{τ,j}m
O(N2)
.
Next we will obtain a bound on the discount factor for guaranteeing a sufficient approximation
of the undiscounted game by the discounted one. We will consider the same formula, strip away the
first two quantifiers, replacing the variable ǫ by a fixed constant and letting λǫ be a free variable.
Next binding the previous free variables v and expressing that these take the values of the value
vector of Γ we in effect obtain a first order formula expressing a sufficient condition for whether
a given discount factor γ = 1 − λ ensures that the values vectors of Γ and Γλ are ǫ-close in every
coordinate.
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Theorem 21. Let Γ be a Gillette game, with N positions. Assume that in position k, the two
players have mk and nk actions available. Assume further that all payoffs and probabilities in Γ
are rational numbers with numerators and denominators of bitsize at most τ .
Let ǫ = 2−j . Then there is a quantified formula with one free variable that gives a sufficient
condition for whether a given discount factor γ = 1−λǫ guarantees that ‖val(Γ)−λǫ val(Γλǫ)‖2 ≤ ǫ.
The formula has five blocks of quantifiers, where the first block consists of N variables, sec-
ond of 1 variable, third and fourth of 2 variables and the fifth of 2N variables. Furthermore the
formula uses at most 6 + 4(m + 2)
∑N
k=1
(nk+mk
mk
)
different polynomials, each of degree at most
2(m + 2) and having coefficients of bitsize at most max{j, 2(N + 1)(m + 2)2 bit(m)τ}, where
m = maxNk=1 (min(nk,mk)).
Proof. Following the proof of Theorem 17 above, we may express the condition by the following
first-order formula with free variable λǫ.
(∃v)(∀λ, 0 < λ ≤ λǫ)(∃v′)(v′ = λ val(Γλ) ∧ ‖v′ − v‖2 < ǫ ∧ v = val(Γ)) ,
and letting v = val(Γ) be a shorthand for the entire formula guaranteed by Theorem 17. We obtain
the formula as claimed by converting the above formula into prenex normal form. The rest of the
analysis follows closely the proof of Theorem 17 and is hence omitted.
We can now apply again the machinery of semi-algebraic geometry to get a bound on λǫ above
as a function of ǫ.
Proposition 22. Let Γ be a Gillette game with N positions, m actions for each player in each
position, and payoffs and transition probabilities being rational numbers with numerators and de-
nominators of bitsize at most τ , and let ǫ = 2−j . Then there exists λǫ = ǫ
τmO(N
2)
, such that
‖val(Γ)− λǫ val(Γλǫ)‖2 ≤ ǫ.
Proof. First we use Theorem 14.16 (Quantifier Elimination) of Basu et al.[3] to the formula of
Theorem 21 to obtain an equivalent quantifier free formula. The (univariate) polynomials in this
formula are of degree mO(N
2) and has coefficients of bitsize max{τ, j}mO(N2) = log(1/ǫ)τmO(N2).
We can then again use Theorem 13.11 (Sampling) of [3], Lemma 15, and Lemma 26 to obtain the
lower bound λǫ = ǫ
τmO(N
2)
.
5 Degree and separation bounds for isolated real solutions
In this section we prove general results about the coordinates of isolated solutions of polynomial
systems. The result as stated below provides concrete bounds on the algebraic degree, coefficient
size and separation.
Theorem 23. Consider a polynomial system of equations
(Σ) g1(x1, . . . , xn) = · · · = gm(x1, . . . , xn) = 0 , (2)
with polynomials of degree at most d and integer coefficients of magnitude at most 2τ .
Then, the coordinates of any isolated (in Euclidean topology) real solutions of the system are
real algebraic numbers of degree at most (2d+ 1)n, and their defining polynomials have coefficients
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of magnitude at most 22n(τ+4n lg(dm))(2d+1)
n−1
. Also, if γj = (γj,1, · · · , γj,n) is an isolated solution
of (Σ), then for any i, either
2−2n(τ+2n lg(dm))(2d+1)
n−1
< |γj,i| or γj,i = 0 . (3)
Moreover, given coordinates of isolated solutions of two such systems, if they are not identical, they
differ by at least
sep(Σ) ≥ 2−3n(τ+2n lg(dm))(2d+1)2n−1− 12 lg(n) . (4)
Before the proof of the theorem we will need to establish some preliminary results.
5.1 Isolated solutions, minimizers and the u-resultant
We will use ideas from [26] used for for global minimization of polynomial functions in order to
reach an appropriate system to analyze. The solutions of the system (Σ), which consists of real
polynomials of total degree at most d, are the minimizers of the polynomial
G(x1, . . . , xn) = g1(x1, . . . , xn)
2 + · · · + gm(x1, . . . , xn)2 (5)
in Rn. Furthermore, if z is an isolated real solution of (Σ), then z is an isolated minimizer for (5).
Let Gi(x) =
∂G(x)
∂xi
. The critical points of G(x) are among the solution set of the system
G1(x) = · · · = Gn(x) = 0. (6)
If the number solutions of the system above is finite, then we can use the multivariate resultant1
[15, 9] to compute them. We homogenize the polynomials using a new variable x0 and introduce
the linear form G0 = u0x0 + u1x1 + · · · + unxn. We then compute the multivariate resultant of
G1, . . . , Gn and G0 with respect to the variables x0, x1, . . . , xn, and a homogeneous polynomial with
degree equal to the product of the degrees of Gi is obtained. This is called the u-resultant [38], see
also [9]. If the number of solutions is finite then the resultant is non-vanishing for almost all linear
forms G0, and if we factorize it to linear forms over the complex numbers then we can recover the
solutions of the system.
To compute, or as in our case to bound, the ℓ-th coordinates of the solution set, we may assume
uℓ = −1 and ui = 0, for all i different from 0 and ℓ. Then the u-resultant is a univariate polynomial
in u0, and its solutions correspond to the ℓ-th coordinates of the solutions of the system.
However, the multivariate resultant vanishes identically if the system has an infinite number of
solutions. This is the case when the variety has positive dimension or, simply, the variety has a
component of positive dimension at infinity, also known as excess component.
5.2 Gro¨bner bases and Deformations
First we recall the following fundamental results from the theory of Gro¨bner bases. Let k be a field
and R = k[x1, . . . , xn]. For an extension field K ⊃ k and an ideal I ⊂ R we let VK(I) := {x ∈ Kn |
f(x) = 0, ∀f ∈ I}.
1Following closely [9], for n homogeneous polynomials f1, . . . , fn in n variables x1, . . . , xn, of degrees d1, . . . , dn
respectively, the multivariate resultant is a single polynomial in the coefficient of fi, the vanishing of which is the
necessary and sufficient condition for the polynomials to have a common non-trivial solution in the algebraic closure
of the field of their coefficients. The resultant is of degree d1d2 · · · di−1di+1 · · · dn in the coefficients of fi.
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Lemma 24. Consider an ideal I ⊂ R, such that d := dimk R/I <∞.
(i) If (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ VK(I). Then zj ∈ K is algebraic over k of degree at most d.
(ii) Suppose that I = (f1, . . . , fn) with
f1(x) = x
d1
1 + h1(x)
...
fn(x) = x
dn
n + hn(x),
where deg(hj) < dj. Then dimkR/I = d1 · · · dn.
Here item (i) follows from the proof of Theorem 6, Chapter 5 of [14] (more precisely, the proof of
(v)⇒ (i)). Item (ii) follows from Proposition 4, also from Chapter 5 of [14], noting that (f1, . . . , fn)
is a Gro¨bner basis with respect to the graded lexicographic order.
Next, in order to apply the u-resultant as described above, we will symbolically perturb the
system. We need to do it in such a way that the perturbed system becomes 0-dimensional and also
that from the solutions of this perturbed system we can recover the isolated real solutions of the
original system. In [26] the deformation
Gλ(x) = G(x) + λ(x
2(d+1)
1 + · · ·+ x2(d+1)n ),
where λ > 0 is introduced. By Lemma 24(ii)
dimRR/∇I(Gλ) ≤ (2d + 1)n
for λ > 0, where ∇I(G) is the gradient ideal (∂Gλ∂x1 , . . . ,
∂Gλ
∂xn
). Let
Xλ = V (∇I(Gλ)) ⊂ Rn.
Notice that |Xλ| ≤ dimk R/∇I(Gλ) = (2d + 1)n. We wish to reason about the “limit” L =
limλ→0Xλ. To make this more precise we define
L = {x ∈ Rn | ∀ǫ > 0∃λǫ > 0 : B(x, ǫ) ∩Xλ 6= ∅, for every λwith 0 < λ < λǫ}.
It is rather difficult to decide if a given point is in L. For one thing the polynomial system may
have several bigger components not related to the limit. In our case, we have the following result,
which allows us to recover the real solution if we solve the system in the limit, that is as λ→ 0.
Proposition 25. If z = (z1, . . . , zn) is an isolated solution of (Σ), eq. (2), then z ∈ L.
Proof. By the isolation of z there exists δ > 0, such that G(x) > 0 for every x ∈ B(z, δ) \ {z}.
Therefore m = min{G(x) | x ∈ ∂B(z, δ)} > 0. Pick λ > 0 so that
Gλ(z) = λ(z
2(d+1)
1 + · · · + z2(d+1)n ) < m
Since
m ≤ min{Gλ(x) | x ∈ ∂B(z, δ)},
we know that the minimum of Gλ on B(z, δ) is attained in B(z, δ)
◦. Thus, Xλ ∩B(z, δ) 6= ∅.
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5.3 Proof of Theorem 23
For the proof of Theorem 23 we additionally need the following fundamental bounds.
Lemma 26. [3, 30, 39] Let f ∈ Z[x] of degree d, then for any non-zero root γ it holds
(2‖f‖∞)−1 ≤ |γ| ≤ 2‖f‖∞ .
If sep f is the separation bound, that is the minimum distance between the roots, then
sep f = min
i 6=j
|γi − γj | ≥ d−(d+2)/2‖f‖1−d2 .
Proof of Theorem 23. Let γj = (γj,1, · · · , γj,n) be isolated real solutions of the system (Σ). As
above, we consider
G(x1, . . . , xn) = g1(x1, . . . , xn)
2 + · · · + gm(x1, . . . , xn)2
and its pertubation
Gλ(x) = G(x) + λ(x
2(d+1)
1 + · · ·+ x2(d+1)n ),
Form the system of partial derivatives
fi = Gi + (2d+ 2)λx
2d+1
i ,
where Gi(x) =
∂G(x)
∂xi
. We homogenize the polynomials using a new variable x0 and introduce the
linear form u0x0 + · · · + unxn specialized to the lth coordinate as describe above. That is we add
the polynomial
f0 = ux0 − x1
Let the resulting system be (Σ0).
For a polynomial f , let L (f) be the maximum coefficient bitsize, that is L (f) = ⌈lg ‖f‖∞⌉. We
have deg(G) ≤ 2d and L (G) ≤ 2τ + 2n lg(dm). Write Gi on the form
Gi(x) =
2d−1∑
j=1
ci,jx
ai,j ∈ Z[x],
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and let c be the set of all coefficients ci,j . It holds that deg(Gi) = 2d − 1,
‖Gi‖∞ ≤ 2d‖G‖∞.
Let D = (2d + 1)n and D1 = (2d + 1)
n−1. For the system (Σ0) we consider the multivariate
resultant R in the variables x0, x1, . . . , xn. It is a polynomial in the coefficients of G, u and λ, that
is R ∈ (Z[c, λ])[u], [15]. It has degree D1 in the coefficients of Gi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and degree D
in the coefficients of G0, which are 1 and u. To be more specific, R is of the form
R = · · ·+ ̺k uk c˜D11,k c˜D12,k · · · c˜D1n,k + . . . ,
where ̺k ∈ Z, and c˜D1i,k is of the form λµci,kD1−µ where the second factor corresponds to a monomial
in the coefficients cij , of total degree D1 − µ, for some µ smaller than D1.
The lowest-degree nonzero coefficient of R, Ru, seen as univariate polynomial in λ, is a projection
operator: it vanishes on the projection of any 0-dimensional component of the algebraic set defined
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by (Σ0) [9, 16, 18]. In our case the ℓ-th coordinates of the isolated solutions of (6) are among the
roots of Ru.
It holds that Ru ∈ Z[c][u], and deg(Ru) ≤ D. Notice that the bound on the degree of Ru, that
is D = (2d+1)n, is also an upper bound on the algebraic degree on the coordinates of the solutions
of (2). Which proves the first assertion of the theorem.
To compute the bounds on the roots of Ru, and thus bounds on the isolated solutions of (6), we
should bound the magnitude of its coefficients. For the latter, it suffices to bound the coefficients
of R. Let
‖R‖∞ ≤ max
k
|̺k c1,kD1 c2,kD1 · · · cn,kD1 | ≤ max
k
|̺k| ·max
k
|c1,kD1 c2,kD1 · · · cn,kD1 | = h · C .
To bound ̺k we need a bound on the number of integer points of the Newton polygons of fi [35],
which we denote by (#Qi). We refer to [18] for details. For all k we have
|̺k| ≤ h = (n+ 1)D
n∏
i=1
(#Qi)
D1 ≤ 2nD1DnD1 .
Moreover
max
k
|c1,kD1 c2,kD1 · · · cn,kD1 | =
n∏
i=1
‖Gi‖D1∞ ≤ (d‖G‖∞)nD1 = C .
Hence
‖Ru‖∞ ≤ ‖R‖∞ ≤ hC = (2Dd‖G‖)nD1 ≤ 22n(τ+2n lg(dm))(2d+1)n−1 .
Using Cauchy’s bound (Lemma 26) any of the non-zero roots γj,i of Ru satisfies
|γj,i| > ‖Ru‖−1∞ ≥ (hC)−1 ≥ 2−2n(τ+2n lg(dm))(2d+1)
n−1
.
Notice that the defining polynomial of γj,i is the square-free part of Ru, which has bitsize at most
2n(τ + 2n lg(dm))(2d + 1)n−1 + (2d+ 1)n−1 + 2 lg(2d+ 1)n−1 ≤ 2n(τ + 4n lg(dm))(2d + 1)n−1.
To bound the minimum distance between the isolated roots of (Σ), we notice that
√
n sep(Σ) ≥ √n min
i 6=j
‖γi − γj‖∞ ≥ min
i 6=j
‖γi − γj‖2 ≥ min
i 6=j
|γi,ℓ − γj,ℓ|,
for any 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n and where the last minimum is considered over all γi,ℓ 6= γj,ℓ.
Using the separation bound for univariate polynomials (Lemma 26), we get
sep(Ru) = min
i 6=j
|γi,ℓ − γj,ℓ| ≥ D−
D+2
2 ‖Ru‖1−D2 ≥ D−
D+2
2 (
√
D‖Ru‖∞)1−D,
and so
sep(Ru) = min
i 6=j
|γi,ℓ − γj,ℓ| ≥ 2−3n(τ+2n lg(dm))(2d+1)2n−1 .
Finally
sep(Σ) ≥ sep(Ru)/
√
n ≥ 2−3n(τ+2n lg(dm))(2d+1)2n−1− 12 lg(n) .
This completes the proof.
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Better bounds should be possible for the algebraic degree of Theorem 23, based for example on
Oleinik-Petrovskii, Milnor-Thom’s [31, 37] bound for the sum of Betti numbers of a set of real zeros
of a polynomial system, or on improved estimates by Basu [2] on individual Betti numbers; see also
[5]. This should lead to improved separation bounds, if used in conjunction with neat deformation
techniques and bounds on parametric Gro¨bner basis, e.g. [5, 27], and/or bounds based on the
Generalized Characteristic Polynomial and sparse multivariate resultants [10, 18]. Nevertheless, it
is not possible to beat the single exponential nature of the bound, and only improvements in the
constants involved are expected.
6 Degree lower bounds for values of Shapley games
In this section we give a construction of a Shapley game ΓN,m with N +1 positions each having at
most m actions, such that the algebraic degree of the value of one of the positions is at least mN .
Previously, Etessami and Yannakakis [20] gave a reduction from the so-called square-root sum
problem to the quantitative decision problem of Shapley games. In fact from this reduction one
can obtain a Shapley game with N positions where the algebraic degree of the value of one of the
positions is 2Ω(N).
Our results below can be viewed as a considerable extension of this, showing how the number
of actions can affect the algebraic degree. Comparing with the upper bound mO(N) shows that our
result is close to optimal. The idea of the game we construct is very simple. The game consists
of a dummy game position that just gives rise to a probability distribution over the remaining
N positions. Each of the remaining N positions are by themselves independent Shapley games
consisting of a single position with m actions. We will construct these N games in such a way
that their values are independent algebraic numbers each of degree m. Then a suitable linear
combination of these, corresponding to the probability distribution, will cause the dummy position
to have a value which is an algebraic number of degree mN .
Actually implementing this approach seems to bring significant challenges whenm > 2. However
using the powerful Hilbert’s irreducibility theorem we are able to give a simple existence proof of
a Shapley game with the properties as stated above. Next, we will also give an explicit proof of
existence using elementary but more involved arguments.
6.1 The single position game
Let α1, . . . , αm > 0 be arbitrary positive numbers and 0 ≤ β < 1. Consider the Shapley game
Γ(α, β) consisting of a single position where each player has m actions, and the payoffs are aii = αi
and aij = 0 for i 6= j, and transition probabilities p11ii = β and p11ij = 0 for i 6= j. Thus to Γ(α, β)
corresponds the parameterized matrix game given by the diagonal matrix diag(α1+βv, . . . , αm+βv).
By Theorem 4, and since the game is given by a diagonal matrix with strictly positive entries
on the diagonal, we find that the value of the game v satisfies the equation
m∑
i=1
v
αi + βv
= 1 . (7)
More precisely, consider a diagonal matrix game diag(a1, . . . , am) with strictly positive entries
a1, . . . , am > 0 on the diagonal, and let p and q be optimal strategies for the row and column player,
respectively, and let v > 0 be the value of the game. Firstly, all pi > 0 as otherwise the column
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player could ensure payoff 0 by playing strategy i. Thus v = aiqi for all i, and hence also qi > 0 for
all i. But then similarly we have v = aipi for all i. Rearranging to pi = v/ai and doing summation
over i gives the claimed equation.
Define the polynomial fm(v) =
∏m
i=1(αi + βv). Then f
′
m(v) = β
∑m
i=1
∏
j 6=i(αj + βv). Multi-
plying by fm(v) on both sides of equation 7 we obtain the following.
fm(v) = v
m∑
i=1
∏
j 6=i
(αj + βjv) =
1
β
vf ′m(v) .
In the following we will specialize β = 1/c, for some c > 1. We then obtain that v is a root in the
univariate polynomial
Fm(v) = fm(v)− cvf ′m(v) .
6.2 Existence using Hilbert’s irreducibility theorem
We next present the simple existence proof using (a version) of Hilbert’s irreducibility theorem.
Lemma 27. If c > 1 is rational, then
Fm(v, α
2
1, . . . , α
2
m) ∈ Q[v, α1, . . . , αm]
is irreducible as a multivariate polynomial in v, α1, . . . , αm.
Proof. This uses induction on m. For m = 1 we have F1 = (1 + 1/c)v + α
2
1 which is irreducible in
Q[v, α1]. The induction step proceeds as follows.
Fm = fm − cvf ′m = (α2m +
1
c
v)fm−1 − cv d
dv
(
(α2m +
1
c
v)fm−1
)
= fm−1α
2
m +
1
c
vfm−1 − cv(1
c
fm−1 + (α
2
m +
1
c
v)f ′m−1)
= fm−1α
2
m +
1
c
vfm−1 − vfm−1 − cvα2mf ′m−1 − v2f ′m−1
= (fm−1 − cvf ′m−1)α2m + v((
1
c
− 1)fm−1 − vf ′m−1)
= Fm−1α
2
m + v
(
(1/c− 1)fm−1 − vf ′m−1
)
.
If Fm−1 is associated to F := (
1
c − 1)fm−1− vf ′m−1 in the polynomial ring Q[v, α1, . . . , αm−1], then
we would have (1c −1)Fm−1 = F leading to the contradiction (1c −1)c = 1. Since Fm−1 is irreducible
by induction, it follows that
gcd(Fm−1, (1/c − 1)fm−1 − vf ′m−1) = 1
and therefore that
Fm = Fm−1α
2
m + v((1/c − 1)fm−1 − vf ′m−1) ∈ Q[v, α1, . . . , αm−1][αm]
is irreducible.
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We recall the following version of Hilbert’s irreducibility theorem (see [22], Corollary 11.7)
sufficient for our purposes.
Theorem 28 (Hilbert). Let K be a finite extension field of Q and f ∈ K[x, y1, . . . , yn] an irreducible
polynomial. Then there exists (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Qn, such that
f(x, α1, . . . , αn) ∈ K[x]
is an irreducible polynomial.
We are now in position to show existence of the Shapley game ΓN,m.
Theorem 29. For any N,m ≥ 1 there exists a Shapley game with N + 1 positions each having m
actions for each player, such that the value position N + 1 in the game is an algebraic number of
degree mN .
Proof. We shall construct the first N positions as independent Shapley games described as above.
For the base case of N = 1, using Lemma 27 we simply invoke Theorem 28 on the polynomial
Fm(v, α
2
1, . . . , α
2
m) with c = 2, say. This gives a specialization of α1, . . . , αm ∈ Q such that the
value of the game Γ((α21, . . . , α
2
m), 1/2) is an algebraic number v1 of degree m.
Now assume by induction that we have constructed N − 1 single-position Shapley games with
values v1, . . . , vN−1 together with positive integer coefficients k1, . . . , kN−1 such that v
′ = k1v1 +
· · · + kN−1vN−1 is an algebraic number of degree mN−1. Invoke Theorem 28 on the polynomial
Fm(v, α
2
1, . . . , α
2
m) as before, but now over the extension field Q(v
′). This again gives a specialization
of α1, . . . , αm ∈ Q such that the value of the game Γ((α21, . . . , α2m), 1/2) is an algebraic number vN
of degree m, but now over Q(v′). We may now find a positive integer k such that v′ + kNvN is an
algebraic number of degree mN−1m = mN over Q.
Now we may construct the N + 1 position game as follows. Let K = k1 + · · ·+ kN . In position
N + 1, regardless of the players actions, with probability 1/2 the game ends, and with probability
1/2ki the play proceeds in position i. No payoff is awarded. Clearly the value of position N + 1 is
exactly (k1v1 + · · ·+ kNvN )/2 and is thus an algebraic number of degree mN .
6.3 An explicit specialization
Write Ek(α) = Ek(α1, . . . , αm) for the kth elementary symmetric polynomial in α1, . . . , am i.e.
Ek(α) =
∑
1≤i1<i2<···<ik≤m
αi1 · · ·αik
for 1 ≤ k ≤ m. For notational convenience we define E0(α) = 1. We have not been able to find a
reference in the literature for the following lemma. For a complete factorization of Sk(x) we refer
to Lemma 35.
Lemma 30. Let Sk(x) = Ek(1, x, . . . , x
m−1), where x is a variable. Then
gcd(S1(x), . . . , Sm−1(x)) = Φm(x),
where Φm is the m-th cyclotomic polynomial.
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Proof. Define
f(t, x) = (t− 1)(t− x)(t− x2) · · · (t− xm−1)
= tm − S1(x)tm−1 + · · · + (−1)m−1Sm−1(x)t+ (−1)mSm(x).
If ξ is a primitive m-th root of unity, then f(t, ξ) = tm − 1 and therefore Sj(ξ) = 0 for j =
1, . . . ,m− 1. If ξ is not a primitive m-th root of unity, then f(t, ξ) has multiple roots showing that
Sj(ξ) 6= 0 for some j = 1, . . . ,m − 1. Thus the greatest common divisor of S1(x), . . . , Sm−1(x) is
the product of (x− ξ), where ξ runs through the primitive m-th roots of unity. This polynomial is
precisely Φm.
We now derive the following formula for Fm giving the coefficients explicitly.
Lemma 31.
Fm(v) =
m∑
k=0
Em−k(α)(1 − ck)(v/c)k .
Proof. First we have
fm(v) =
m∏
i=1
(ai + v/c) =
m∑
k=0
Em−k(α)(v/c)
k ,
and thus
f ′m(v) =
m∑
k=0
Em−k(α)kv
k−1(1/c)k .
We can then conclude
Fm(v) =
m∑
k=0
Em−k(α)((v/c)
k − cv(kvk−1(1/c)k)) =
m∑
k=0
Em−k(α)((1 − ck)(v/c)k) .
Lemma 32. The polynomial
F (v) =
m∑
k=0
Em−k(α)(1 − ck)cm−kvk = cmFm(v) , (8)
is irreducible for an infinite number of specializations of α and c.
Proof. We consider the polynomial G(v) = vmF (1/v). Obviously F (v) is irreducible if and only if
G(v) is. Moreover, we let αi = x
i−1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, for x ∈ Z+ to be specified in the sequel. By
abuse of notation we also denote this polynomial as G(v), which is
G(v) =
m∑
k=0
(1− (m− k)c)ck · Sk(x) · vk.
By Lemma 30 all the coefficients of G(v), except the leading and the trailing coefficient, have
Φm(x) as a common divisor. Now specialize to x = ℓm with ℓ ≫ 0 and ℓ ∈ N. Let p be a prime
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divisor in Φm(x). Then p ∤ x. There exists infinitely many c ∈ N, such that p | 1−mc, since p ∤ m.
By possibly replacing c by c+ p we may assume that 1−mc = bp, where p ∤ b.
With this choice of c, p ∤ c and p divides the constant term of G(v) precisely once. Moreover, p
is not a divisor of the leading coefficient of G(v), which is xm(m−1)/2cm.
We conclude using Eisenstein’s criterion (Theorem 36) all but that G(v), and hence F (v), is
irreducible for this class of (infinite) specializations.
Lemma 33. Let Fj(v) as in (8), i.e.
Fj(v) =
m∑
k=0
Em−k(a1j , . . . , amj)(1 − cjk)cm−kj vk , (9)
where 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Let γj be any root of Fj(v), then there is an infinite number of specializations of
aij and cj , such that
[Q(γ1, . . . , γn) : Q] = m
n.
Proof. We consider the specialization aij = x
i−1, where 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, for a x ∈ Z+ to be
specified in the sequel.
As before, we let Sk(m) = Ek(1, x, . . . , x
m−1), and we perform the transformations Gj(v) =
vmFj(1/v), where 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and we obtain the polynomials
Gj(v) =
m∑
k=0
(1− (m− k)cj) ckj · Sk(m) · vk.
We pick a x ∈ Z+ so that Φm(x) has at least n distinct prime factors, p1, . . . , pn, that are
relative prime to m. For such a procedure we refer to Lemma 39. For 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we choose cj so
that the equation 1−mcj = bjpj is satisfied for an integer bj , and pj is not a divisor of bj .
All, but the leading and trailing, coefficients of Gj have Φm(x) as their common GCD, according
to Lemma 30, and hence they are 0 mod pj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
To summarize, for the n primes, pj, it holds:
• None of them divides any of the leading coefficients of Gj .
• For each j, pj divides the constant term of Gj(v), p2j does not, and pj does not divide any of
the constant term of the other polynomials.
• For all Gj , all the coefficients but the leading and the constant term, are divided by pj.
Hence, according to Theorem 37, if γj is a root of Gj , then
[Q(γ1, . . . , γn) : Q] = m
n.
Lemma 34. Let Fj(v) as in (9), and let γj be any root of Fj(v), then there is an infinite number
of specializations of aij and cj , such that for all but a finite number of kj ∈ Q, it holds
[Q(γ1 + k2γ2 + · · ·+ knγn) : Q] = mn ,
where 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
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Proof. The existence of ki is guaranteed from the existence of primitive element [38]. That is for
all but a finite number of values of kj ∈ Q it holds Q(γ1, . . . , γn) = Q(γ1 + k2γ2 + · · ·+ knγn), and
from Lemma 33 we conclude for the degree.
To find explicit values for ki we modify slightly the proof of the existence of primitive element
[38]. Let γji be all the roots of Fj(v), where 1 ≤ i ≤ m. It is without loss of generality to assume
that γi = γj1.
Let β2 = γ1 + k2γ2. For Q(β2) = Q(γ1, γ2) to hold, it should be
k2 6= γ11 − γ1i
γ2ℓ − γ21 ,
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 < ℓ ≤ m, and hence there are at most (m − 1)m forbidden values for k2.
This means that there is at least one positive integer between 0 and m2, that we can assign k2 to,
so that Q(γ1 + k2γ2) = Q(β2) = Q(γ1, γ2).
If we let β3 = β2 + k3γ3 = γ1+ k2γ2+ k3γ3, then for Q(β3) = Q(γ1, γ2, γ3) to hold, it should be
k3 6= β21 − β2i
γ3ℓ − γ31 =
(γ11 − γ1,i1) + k2(γ21 − γ2,i2)
γ3ℓ − γ31 ,
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m2, 1 < i1 ≤ m, 1 < i2 ≤ m and 1 < ℓ ≤ m. Hence there are at most (m− 1)m2)
forbidden values for k3, and so there at least two integers between 0 and (m− 1)m+ (m− 1)m2 =
(m− 1)2m, that k2 and k3 could be assign to, so that Q(β3) = Q(γ1, γ2, γ3).
We continue similarly, and eventually we let
β = βn = βn−1 + knγn = γ1 + k2γ2 + · · ·+ knγn .
We consider
kn 6= βn−1,1 − βn−1,i
γnℓ − γn1 =
(γ11 − γ1,i1) + k2(γ21 − γ2,i2) + · · ·+ kn−1(γn−1,1 − γn−1,in−1)
γnℓ − γn1 ,
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ mn−1, 1 ≤ iℓ ≤ m, and 1 < ℓ ≤ m. There are at mn−1(m− 1) forbidden values for
kn.
Overall, there is at least n− 1 integers between 0 and m(mn−1− 1) ∼ mn that k2, . . . , kn, could
be assigned to, so that
Q(γ1, . . . , γn) = Q(γ1 + k2γ2 + · · ·+ knγn) .
Using the previous lemma we conclude for the degree.
Now combining Lemma 33 and Lemma 34 we can immediately turn the proof of Theorem 29
into an explicit proof of existence.
6.3.1 Auxiliary results
A similar lemma appears in [36].
Lemma 35. Let Ek be the elementary symmetric polynomials in n variables a1, . . . , an, where
0 ≤ k ≤ n, that is Ek(a1, . . . , an) =
∑
1≤i1<i2<···<ik≤n
ai1 · · · aik .
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Let Sk(n) = Ek(1, x, . . . , x
n−1), where 1 ≤ k ≤ n, then it holds that
Sk(n) = x
k(k−1)/2
k∏
ℓ=1
(xn−ℓ+1 − 1)/Φ⌊k/ℓ⌋ℓ (x)
= xk(k−1)/2
∏
i1|n
Φi1(x)
∏
i2|(n−1)
Φi2(x) · · ·
∏
ik|(n−k+1)
Φik(x)/
(
k∏
ℓ=1
Φ
⌊k/ℓ⌋
ℓ (x)
)
,
where Φℓ = Φℓ(x) is the ℓ-th cyclotomic polynomial.
Proof. We prove the formula using double induction.
Evidently the formula holds for S1(1), and we can easily prove that it holds for S1(n), for every
n. It also holds for Sk(k) for all k.
For the definition of the elementary symmetric polynomials it holds that Ek(a1, . . . , an) =
Ek(a1, . . . , an−1) + anEk−1(a1, . . . , an−1), and hence Sk(n) = Sk(n − 1) + xn−1Sk−(n − 1). We
assume that the formula holds for Sk(n− 1) and Sk−1(n− 1) and we prove that it holds for Sk(n).
Sk(n) = Sk(n− 1) + xn−1Sk−1(n− 1)
= xk(k−1)/2
k∏
λ=1
xn−λ − 1
Φ
⌊k/λ⌋
λ
+ xn−1 · x(k−1)(k−2)/2
k−1∏
µ=1
xn−µ − 1
Φ
⌊(k−1)/µ⌋
µ
= xk(k−1)/2
∏k−1
λ=1(x
n−λ − 1)∏k
λ=1 Φ
⌊k/λ⌋
λ
(xn−k − 1 + xn−k
∏
µ|k
Φµ)
= xk(k−1)/2
∏k−1
λ=1(x
n−λ − 1)∏k
λ=1 Φ
⌊k/λ⌋
λ
(xn−k − 1 + xn−k(xk − 1))
= xk(k−1)/2
k∏
λ=1
(xn−λ+1 − 1)
Φ
⌊k/λ⌋
λ
.
The formula follows if we also consider that xn − 1 =∏ℓ|nΦℓ.
Theorem 36 (Eisenstein’s criterion). Let f(x) = anx
n+ · · ·+a1x+a0 be a polynomial with integer
coefficients. Let p be a prime such that (i) p divides each ai for 1 ≤ i < n, (ii) p does not divide
an, and (iii) p
2 does not divide a0, then f is irreducible over the rational numbers.
Theorem 37 (Generalized Eisenstein’s criterion). [28] Let
fi(x) = x
ni + ai,1x
ni−1 + · · ·+ ai,ni ,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ s and all the coefficients of all the polynomials belong to O.
If there exists non-archimedean valuations v1, v2, . . . , vs of K such that t(v1) = p1, . . . , t(vs) = ps
are distinct primes, and that
vi(ai,ni) = 1, vi(aj,nj) = 0, and vi(ak,r) ≥ 1,
where 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ s, i 6= j, 1 ≤ r ≤ nk − 1, then, for any choice of the roots of fi(x), say γi,
1 ≤ i ≤ s, we have
[K(γ1, . . . , γs) : K] = n1n2 · · ·ns.
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Remark 38 (A note on the leading coefficient). Theorem 37 is a generalization of Eisenstein’s
criterion. It assumes that all the polynomials are monic. However, it is without loss of generality
to assume that the corresponding primes do not divide the leading coefficients. This is so because
we can transform a non-monic polynomial to a monic one, such that the theorem holds, as follows:
Given a polynomial
g(x) = anx
n + an−1x
n−1 + · · · + a1x+ a0,
where an 6= 1, we multiply all the coefficients by an−1n then
g1(x) = a
n
nx
n + an−1a
n−1
n x
n−1 + · · ·+ an−1n a1x+ an−1n a0.
If we set y = anx, then
g2(y) = y
n + an−1y
n−1 + · · · + an−2n a1y + an−1n a0 = yn + cn−1yn−1 + · · ·+ c1y + c0
where in order Eisenstein’s criterion, or its generalization, to hold, it suffices a prime p not to
divide the leading coefficient of g, an. If the roots of g2 are βi, then the roots of g are γi = βi/an.
Lemma 39. Let f ∈ Z[x] be a non-constant polynomial and a an integer, such that f(a) has the
prime divisors p1, . . . , pk with k ≥ 1. Then there exists an integer b, such that f(b) is divisible by
at least k + 1 primes.
Proof. We consider the polynomial
g(x) := f(f(a)2x+ a) = f(a) + f(a)2xh(x) = f(a)(1 + f(a)xh(x)),
where h(x) ∈ Z[x] is non-zero. Notice that g(x) is divisible by p1, . . . , pk for every x ∈ Z. Now the
result follows, since a prime dividing 1 + f(a)xh(x) for x ∈ Z cannot be among p1, . . . , pk.
7 Upper bounds for value and strategy iteration for concurrent
reachability games
In this section we explain how the techniques of Section 4 as used for Everett games, also yields an
improved analysis of the strategy improvement algorithm for concurrent reachability games.
Let Γ be an Everett game, with N positions. Assume that in position k, the two players have
mk ≤ m and nk ≤ m actions available. Assume further that all payoffs and probabilities in Γ are
rational numbers with numerators and denominators of bitsize at most τ . Further, let σ be a fixed
positive integer.
From Lemma 14 we get the following statement.
Lemma 40. There is a quantifier free formula with 2N free variables v1 and v2 that expresses
v1 ∈ C1(Γ), v2 ∈ C2(Γ), and ‖v1 − v2‖2 ≤ 2−σ.
The formula uses at most (2N + 1) + 2(m + 2)
∑N
k=1
(nk+mk
mk
)
different polynomials, each of
degree at most m + 2 and having coefficients of bitsize at most max(σ, 2(N + 1)(m + 2)τ), where
m = maxNk=1 (min(nk,mk)).
Theorem 41. Let Γ and σ be as above. Let ǫ = 2−σ. Then there exists ǫ-optimal strategy of
Γ where each probability is a real algebraic number, defined by a polynomial of degree mO(N) and
maximum coefficient bitsize max(σ, τ)mO(N).
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Proof. We use Theorem 13.11 of [3] to find a univariate representation of the pair (v1, v2) satisfying
the formula from Lemma 40. That is we have polynomials f, g0, . . . , g2N , with f and g0 coprime,
such that the points (v1, v2) are given as (g1(t)/g0(t), . . . , g2N (t)/g0(t)), where t is a root of f .
These polynomials are of degree mO(N) and their maximum coefficient bitsize is max(σ, τ)mO(N).
Now consider the matrix games Ak(v1) for all positions k. We find optimal strategies p
1, . . . , pN
that correspond to basic feasible solutions of the linear program LP (1). Notice that the elements
of these matrix games are rational polynomial functions in g0, . . . , gN . By Lemma 3 we have
pki = det((M
Ak
Bk
)i)/det(M
Ak
Bk
) for some potential basis sets B1, . . . , Bk. Using Lemma 10, each pki
is a rational polynomial function in g0, . . . , gN of degree m
O(N) and maximum coefficient bitsize
max(σ, τ)mO(N). Substituting the root t of f using Lemma 15 we obtain the statement.
Using Lemma 26 we deduce:
Corollary 42. An Everett game with coefficient bitsize bounded by τ has a 2−σ optimal strategy
where the probabilities are either zero or bounded from below by 2−max(σ,τ)m
O(N)
.
We now apply Lemma 3 of Hansen, Ibsen-Jensen and Miltersen [24] and conclude that value
iteration and strategy iteration on a deterministic concurrent reachability game (where τ = O(1))
will compute an ǫ-optimal strategy after at most (1ǫ )
mO(N) iterations. This matches the lower bound
obtained by Hansen, Ibsen-Jensen and Miltersen [24].
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